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CASE NOTES
resulting situation would be an arbitration agreement unenforceable in
the Illinois courts because there was no existing dispute when executed,
but valid, enforceable, and irrevocable in the federal court hearing the
case because of diversity.
Congress has not seen fit to make arbitration agreements federal ques-
tions. Since the jurisdiction of the federal courts in matters of arbitration
must be based on diversity, or a federal question, the more utilitarian
solution to this problem would be strict adherence to the Erie doctrine
and Justice Frankfurter's reasoning in the Bernhardt case. Conflicting re-
sults in state and federal courts dealing with the same arbitration agree-
ment in the same state would thus be avoided.
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-LIKELIHOOD OF THE DEFEND-
ANT CONTINUING IN THE NARCOTICS TRAFFIC
HELD SUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO DENY
BAIL PENDING APPEAL
The defendant was found guilty by a jury of a violation of the Federal
Narcotic Control Act involving twelve ounces of heroin.1 The trial judge
entered a conviction, sentenced the defendant to fifteen years in prison
and imposed a fine of $10,000. Following motions after verdict the de-
fendant served notice of intent to appeal, and asked that bond be set. The
trial judge refused to enlarge the defendant on bail pending appeal for
reasons, inter alia, that the defendant had been previously convicted of a
narcotic offense by the same court, and served a sentence of some three
years, but did not learn from his previous experience and had returned to
unlawful dealings in narcotic drugs. Under such circumstances, the trial
judge refused to assume the responsibility of putting defendant on the
street where he could again commit such violations. The trial court also
found defendant's appeal to be frivolous. The defendant appealed this
ruling and, in a memorandum and order, the appellate court affirmed the
1 21 U.S.C.A. § 174 (Supp., 1959) provides: "Whoever fraudulently or knowingly
imports or brings any narcotic drug into the United States or any territory under
its control or jurisdiction, contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any
manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of any such narcotic drug
after being imported or brought in, knowing the same to have been imported or
brought into the United States contrary to law, or conspires to commit any such
acts in violation of the laws of the United States, shall be imprisoned not less than
five or more than twenty years, and, in addition, may be fined not more than $20,000.
For a second or subsequent offense (as determined under section 7237(c) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954), the offender shall be imprisoned not less than ten or
more than forty years and, in addition, may be fined not more than $20,000.
"Whenever on trial for a violation of this section the defendant is shown to have
or to have had possession of the narcotic drug, such possession shall be deemed sufficient
evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains the possession to the
satisfaction of the jury."
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trial court's decision denying defendant bail pending appeal. United States
v. Campbell, No. 12903 (C.A. 7th, 1960).
Bail pending appeal is allowed by Rule 46 (a) (2) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. As amended in 1956: "Bail may be allowed pend-
ing appeal or certiorari unless it appears that the appeal is frivolous or
taken for delay. ' 2 Prior to this amendment, bail was authorized only if it
appeared that the appeal or petition for certiorari involved substantial
questions for review.3 Bail may now be allowed on appeals to a court of
appeals by the trial judge, by the court of appeals, or by any judge thereof
or by the circuit justice. If bail is allowed, it runs until final termination
of the proceedings in all courts. Pending appeals or petitions for certiorari
to the Supreme Court, bail may be allowed by the court of appeals or by
any judge thereof or the Supreme Court or any Justice thereof. Any court
or justice authorized to grant bail may at any time revoke the order ad-
mitting the defendant to bail.4
The legislative purpose of the new rule was to liberalize the basis for
allowing bail in the federal courts pending appeal, guarding against the
risk of incarceration for a conviction which might later be upset. The ef-
fect of the amendment was to shift the burden on the convicted defend-
ant to establish eligibility for bail and to require the government to per-
suade the trial judge that the minimum standards for allowing bail have
not been met.5
Further, the new rule vests the court with discretion concerning mat-
ters other than determining whether the appeal is frivolous or taken for
delay. In United States v. Williams,6 the court said:
It is obvious that where there is no showing that the appeal is frivolous or
taken for delay, and under the plain language of the Rule that bail may be
allowed, there are some cases where, under the facts, the court is allowed ...
discretion in passing upon such a motion as before us here.7
In the exercise of such discretion, a trial judge may deny bail pending
appeal if a bail bond will not adequately protect against the possibility of
flight.8 It has also been held that the character and extent of a series of
offenses may afford a proper basis for the exercise of discretionary power
to deny bail pending appeal. 9
2 18 U.S.C., Rule 46(a) (2) (Supp., 1959) (emphasis supplied).
818 U.S.C.A., Rule 46(a) (2) (Supp., 1959).
4 18 U.S.C.A., Rule 46(a) (2) (Supp., 1955).
5 Ward v. United States, 76 S.Ct.1063 (1956).
6 253 F.2d 144 (C.A.7th, 1958).
7 Ibid., at 148.
8 United States v. Coduto, No. 12847 (C.A.7th, 1959), Petition for bail addressed to
Mr. Justice Clark denied.
9 United States v. Wilson, 257 F.2d 796 (C.A.2d, 1958).
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The novel point in the Campbell case is that the court of appeals sus-
tained the trial court's exercise of discretion in denying bail under Rule
46 (a) (2) and established for the first time that the likelihood of the de-
fendant continuing in the narcotics traffic is sufficient grounds to deny
bail pending appeal. In other words, the area of discretion that still re-
mains under the amended rule to deny bail pending appeal is extended by
this case to include the likelihood of the defendant continuing in the nar-
cotics traffic. Heretofore, only the likelihood of flight and the character
and extent of a series of offenses have afforded a proper basis for exercise
of discretionary power to deny bail pending appeal. 10
The Campbell opinion is not a clear-cut decision on this point alone
since the court of appeals also adopted the trial court's finding that the
appeal was frivolous. However, the language of the memorandum opin-
ion suggests that weight was placed on the likelihood of the defendant
continuing in the narcotics traffic as a sound reason for denying bail
pending appeal in narcotic cases. The court said:
Following motions after verdict the trial court refused to enlarge the de-
fendant on bail for reasons, inter alia, that the defendant was convicted of a
transaction involving an especially large amount of heroin; that the defendant
had been previously convicted of a narcotic offense by the same court, but
did not learn from his previous experience, and had returned to dealing in
unlawful narcotic drugs. The trial court also made a finding that the instant
appeal is frivolous. . . . Upon consideration of the records, files, and briefs
herein, and considering Rule 46 (a) (2) Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
providing that the grant or denial of bail pending appeal is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court to which application is made, it is ordered, the
motion of defendant-appellant to be enlarged on bail pending appeal be and
the same is hereby DENIED."
The ruling in the Campbell case is the latest in a series of rulings by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals denying bail pending appeal in narcotic
cases in which that part of Rule 46 (a) (2) relating to "frivolous" appeals
and appeals "taken for delay" was not in issue. In United States v. Davis,1 2
decided December 28, 1959, the court denied bail pending appeal to a de-
fendant with a twenty-five year history of narcotic violations on the au-
thority of its order in United States v. Coduto13 which was decided De-
cember 2, 1959. The Coduto opinion emphasized the possibility of the
defendants fleeing from the jurisdiction of the court as "a danger not to
be disregarded"'14 and found that in reaching such a conclusion the trial
10 Cases cited notes 8, 9 supra.
11 United States v. Campbell, No. 12903 (C.A.7th, 1960).
12 No. 12870 (C.A.7th, 1959).
'3 No. 12847 (C.A.7th, 1959), Petition for bail addressed to Mr. Justice Clark denied.
14 Ibid., at 3.
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court did not abuse its discretion in the exercise of sound judgment. Even
though the defendants in the Coduto case were first offenders, the record
of the trial discloses that they were engaged in the sale of heroin in whole-
sale quantities. Therefore, it is not surprising that one of the reasons why
the trial court declined to enlarge the defendants on bail was "to halt their
trafficking in heroin during the pendency of any appeal they may prose-
cute."' 5
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, as Circuit Justice in the Ward case stated
that: "Elaboration of whatever occasions for discretion may remain [in
Rule 46 (a) (2)] had better be left to the specific occasions which may
give rise to such claims."'16 Seemingly if a narcotics case involving a sec-
ond offender reaches the Supreme Court they may hold that it is a reason-
able exercise of discretion under Rule 46 (a) (2) for the trial judge to
deny bail pending appeal because there is a likelihood of the defendant
continuing in the narcotics traffic. It is probably a matter of judicial no-
tice that dealing in narcotics is one of the most profitable of criminal en-
terprises and that major offenders tend to continue in that enterprise after
conviction. Further, the court may consider that because of the extreme
length of the sentences imposed for narcotic violations and the fact that
many narcotic violators will never be eligible for parole, it is relatively
unimportant to them whether additional criminal liability may result
from new narcotics offenses." Another consideration which the court
may entertain is that the well known practical result of releasing narcotic
violators on bail pending appeal is to give them another year in which to
sell narcotics to finance their appeals.' s Finally, it appears that the denial
of bail pending appeal in narcotic cases may be an exercise of sound judi-
cial discretion for the purposes of safeguarding the public interest when
the facts of the particular case indicate the defendants are likely to con-
tinue in the narcotics traffic.
Consideration of the cases ruling on the residuary discretion remaining
in Rule 46 (a) (2) to deny bail pending appeal leads to the conclusion that
15 Transcript of Record at 3, United States v. Coduto No. 58 CR 32 (N.D. Ill., 1959).
1 W\Vard v. United States, 76 S.Ct. 1063, 1065 (1956).
17 26 U.S.C.A. 5 7237 (d) (Supp., 1959) provides: "Upon conviction
(1) of any offense the penalty for which is provided in subsection (b) of this sec-
tion, subsection (c),(h), or (i) of section 2 of the Narcotic Drugs Import and
Export Act, as amended, or such Act of July 11, 1941, as amended or
(2) of any offense the penalty for which is provided in subsection (a) of this sec-
tion, if it is the offender's second or subsequent offense,
the imposition or execution of sentence shall not be suspended, probation shall not be
granted, section 4202 of title 18 of the United State Code shall not apply, and the Act
of July 15, 1932 (47 Stat. 696; D.C. Code 24-201 and following), as amended, shall not
apply."
18 Chicago Daily News S 1, p. 18, col. 1 (February 8, 1960).
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the denial of bail pending appeal in the Campbell case was a proper exer-
cise of the court's discretion. However, a court in exercising its discretion
under Rule 46 (a) (2) in narcotic cases should carefully consider the fac-
tual situation in each case. Perhaps more leniency should be exercised in
the case of first offenders than in the case of second offenders. Moreover,
bail should never be denied for the purpose of punishment, since the
judgment of conviction cannot be executed while the matter is stayed
pending appeal. 19
19 Cf. Reynolds v. United States, 80 S.Ct. 30 (1959).
LABOR LAW-BUSINESS HOURS NOT PROPER SUBJECT
FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Jewel Tea Co. filed suit against Locals 189, 262, 320, 546, 547, 571 and
638 of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North
America AFL-CIO, and several officials of the union, alleging a violation
of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.' The complaint alleged
that the defendants had engaged in an unlawful combination and con-
spiracy to suppress competition among retail meat markets in the Chicago
area and to prevent all sale of meats and meat products before 9 a.m. or
after 6 p.m. It was pleaded that under compulsion of the alleged conspir-
acy and the threat of strike by the unions, the plaintiff was forced to sign
contracts with the defendant unions containing, among other things, a
restriction that market operating hours shall be 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
Monday through Saturday, inclusive. No customer coming into the mar-
ket before or after said hours would be served. The operation of the
agreements has enabled Associated Food Retailers of Greater Chicago,
Inc., a major competitor, to remain closed after 6 p.m. without fear of
losing trade to plaintiff, because of evening sales, and also to avoid the
added expense of remaining open during the evening. Jewel Tea Co. v.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters, No. 12653 (C.A.7th, 1960).
The defendants appealed from orders by the United States District
Court denying their motion to dismiss the complaint; the court of appeals
affirmed the district court's orders and remanded the suit to the district
court for determination of the amount of damages. Certiorari was denied
by the Supreme Court of the United States. Docket No. 732 (March 28,
1960). 28 Law Week 3283.
While Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act prohibit any contract or
conspiracy in restraint of trade, such anti-trust legislation is not applicable
1 Also named as defendants, but not parties to the appeal, are Associated Food Re-
tailers of Greater Chicago, Inc., a not-for-profit trade association representing several
thousand individual or independent food stores engaged in the retail sale of meat in the
Greater Chicago area, and the secretary-treasurer of said association.
